

## More Voices Than Ever? Quantifying Media Bias in Networks

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### Abstract

Social media, such as blogs, are often seen as democratic entities that allow more voices to be heard than the conventional mass or elite media. Some also feel that social media exhibits a balancing force against the arguably slanted elite media. A systematic comparison between social and mainstream media is necessary but challenging due to the scale and dynamic nature of modern communication. Here we propose empirical measures to quantify the extent and dynamics of social (blog) and mainstream (news) media bias. We focus on a particular form of bias—coverage quantity—as applied to stories about the 111th US Congress. We compare observed coverage of Members of Congress against a null model of unbiased coverage, testing for biases with respect to political party, popular front runners, regions of the country, and more. Our measures suggest distinct characteristics in news and blog media. A simple generative model, in agreement with data, reveals differences in the process of coverage selection between the two media.

“In the end, we’ll have more voices and more options.”

– Dan Gillmor, *We the media*

### Introduction

Gillmor (2004) envisioned social media, powered by the growth of the Internet and related technologies, as a form of grassroots journalism that blurs the line between producers and consumers and changes how information and opinions are distributed. He argued that “the communication network itself will be a medium for everyone’s voice, not just the few who can afford to buy multimillion-dollar printing presses, launch satellites, or win the government’s permission to squat on the public airways.” This view has been embraced by activists who consider social media as a balancing force to the conventionally assumed slanted or biased elite media. Indeed, social media can be used by underprivileged citizens, promising a profound impact and a healthy democracy.

Many believe that the mainstream media is slanted, but disagree about the *direction* of slant. The conventional belief

about media bias has held for decades, but attempts at developing objective measurement have only recently begun. The study by Groseclose and Milyo (2005) showed the presence of bias in mass media (cable and print news) and new media (Internet websites, etc.). Their results, despite receiving criticism, are fairly consistent with conventional wisdom. On the other hand, researchers have observed an “echo chamber” effect within the new media – people select particular news to reinforce their existing beliefs and attitudes. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) argued that such selective exposure is especially likely in the new media environment due to information overload. With search, filtering, and communication technologies, people can easily discover and disseminate information that are supportive or consistent with their existing beliefs.

Do social media exhibit more or less bias than mass media and, if so, to what extent? Identifying media bias is challenging for a number of reasons. First, bias is not easy to observe. It has been recognized that “bias is in the eyes of the beholder” meaning that, e.g., conservatives tend to believe that there is a liberal bias in the media while liberals tend to believe there is a conservative bias (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Yano, Resnik, and Smith 2010). Hence, finding textual indicators of bias is difficult, if not impossible. Second, the assessment of bias usually implies knowing what “fairness” would be, which may not be available or consistent across different viewpoints. Third, Internet-based communication promises easy, inexpensive, and instant information distribution, which not only increases the number of online media outlets, but also the amount and frequency of information and opinions delivered through these outlets. The scale and dynamic nature of today’s communication should be accounted for.

In this paper, our major contribution is that we propose empirical measures to quantify the extent and dynamics of “bias” in mainstream and social media (hereafter referred to as *News* and *Blogs*, respectively). Our measurements are not normative judgment, but examine bias by looking at the attributes of those being mentioned, against a null model of “unbiased” coverage. We focus on the number of times a member of the 111th US congress was *referenced*, and study the distribution and dynamics of the references within a large set of media outlets. We consider “the unbiased” as a configurable baseline distribution and measure how the ob-

served coverage deviates from this baseline, with the measurement uncertainty of observations taken into account. We demonstrate bias measures for slants in favor of specific political parties, popular front-runners, or certain geographical regions. Using these measures to examine newly collected data, we have observed distinct characteristics of how News and Blogs cover the US congress. Our analysis of party and ideological bias indicates that Blogs are not significantly less slanted than News. However, their slant orientations are more sensitive to exogenous factors such as national elections. In addition, blogs' interests are less concentrated on particular front-runners or regions than news outlets.

While our measures are independent of content, we further investigate two aspects of the content related to our measures: the hyperlinks embedded in articles and sentiments detected from the articles. The hyperlink patterns suggest that outlets with a Democrat-slant (D-slant for short) are more likely to cite each other than outlets with a Republican-slant (R-slant). The sentiment analysis suggests there is a weak correlation between negative sentiments and our measures.

To better understand the distinctive slant structures between the two media, we propose to use a simple "wealth allotment" model to explain how legislators gain attention (references) from different media. The results about blog media's inclination to a rich-get-richer mechanism indicates they are more likely to echo what others have mentioned. This observation does not contradict our measures of bias – compared with news media, blogs are weaker adherents to particular parties, front-runners or regions but are more susceptible to the network and exogenous factors.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first discuss related work, followed by the details of our collected data. We then detail the different types of coverage bias and how to quantify them and then examine the results, both structurally (via hyperlinking) and textually (via text-based sentiment analysis). Finally, we present a simple generative model of media coverage and conclude with a discussion of open issues and future work.

## Related Work

Concerns about mainstream media bias have been a controversial and critical subject in journalism due to the media's power to shape a democratic society. Studies on media bias can involve surveys and interviews (Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter 1986), and content analysis (Eldridge and Philo 1995), as well as theoretical models such as structural economic causes. Apart from these qualitative arguments, Groseclose and Milyo (2005) proposed a media bias measure that counts how often a particular media outlet cites various think tanks and policy groups.

There have been controversial responses to prior studies, and the origin in part lies in the difficulty to separate the recognition of bias from the belief of bias. A dependence on viewers' beliefs has been observed in studies (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Yano, Resnik, and Smith 2010), which is relevant to the theories on how supply-side forces or profit-related factors cause slants in media

(Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow 2010). Because of such a dependency, computationally identifying bias from media content remains an emerging research topic, and requires insights from other language analysis studies such as sentiment analysis (Pang and Lee 2008) or partisan features in texts (Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn 2008; Gentzkow 2010).

While mass media have the ability to affect the public's interests, social media represent large samples of expression from both influencers and those being influenced. Hence the "crowd voice" collected in social media has attracted considerable research. The viral behavior and predictive power of social media in response to politics, the economy and other areas has been examined in recent studies (Leskovec, Backstrom, and Kleinberg 2009; O'Connor et al. 2010). For example, Leskovec et al. (2009) tracked the traversal of "memes" based on short distinctive phrases echoed by online news and blogs over time. Another work by O'Connor et al. (2010) studied the relationship between tweet sentiments and polls in order to examine how the sentiments expressed in the Twitter microblogging social media can be used as political or economic indicators.

In this paper, we do not attempt to tackle the computationally difficult task of identifying bias in media text. Instead, we study the characteristics of the two media based on purely quantitative measures independent of media content. We are interested in studying the role of today's social media, and we hope our analysis will contribute to the growing understanding of this subject.

## Data Model

**Data Collection** Our data is based on RSS feeds aggregated by OpenCongress<sup>12</sup>. OpenCongress is a non-profit, non-partisan public resource website that brings together official government data with timely information about what is happening in Congress. We continuously monitor and collect the OpenCongress RSS feeds for each individual member of Congress<sup>3</sup>. This paper examines News and Blogs coverage about the 111th US Congress, both Senators and Representatives. The dataset spans from September 1 to January 4, covering the 2010 mid-term election on November 2.

Figure 1 shows the volume (total number of news articles or blog posts) over time in this dataset. The central peak corresponds to the mid-term election. In total, there are 57,221 news articles and 66,830 blog posts being collected in the four-month period.

**Networked Data Model** We study the structure of the two media by constructing a modal network containing different types of nodes and edges. The network structure is illustrated in Fig. 2. More specifically, we have:

<sup>1</sup>[www.opencongress.org](http://www.opencongress.org)

<sup>2</sup>OpenCongress uses Daylife ([www.daylife.com](http://www.daylife.com)) and Technorati ([technorati.com](http://technorati.com)) to aggregate articles from these feeds. The possible selection biases in these filtering processes are not considered in this paper.

<sup>3</sup>An example news/blog coverage feed can be found at [http://www.opencongress.org/people/news\\_blogs/300075\\_Lisa\\_Murkowski](http://www.opencongress.org/people/news_blogs/300075_Lisa_Murkowski)




Figure 1: The volume (total number of news articles or blog posts) over time. The highest peak corresponds to the mid-term election.

**Nodes** There are three sets of nodes: a news set, denoted by  $V_N$ , that contains 5,149 news outlets, a blog set  $V_B$  of 19,693 blogs<sup>4</sup>, and a legislator set  $V_L$  that covers 530 lawmakers.

**Edges** Each edge  $e_{ik}$  records when media outlet  $i$  publishes an article referencing legislator  $k$ . We extract 64,222 such edges in 46,501 news articles, denoted as edge set  $E_{NL}$ , and 91,837 edges in 62,301 blog posts, denoted as  $E_{BL}$ . Edges are associated with timestamps and texts.

**Node attributes** For legislators, we record attributes such as party, district, etc., based on the legislators’ profiles and external data sources.

While we focus on “reference” or citation edges, this networked model can also include other types of edges, e.g. hyperlinks between outlets, voting preferences among legislators, etc.

## Types of Bias

In journalism, the term “media bias” refers to the selection of which events and stories are reported and how they are covered within the mass media. The most commonly discussed biases include reporting that supports (or attacks) particular political parties, candidates, ideologies, corporations, races, etc. In this paper, we begin with perhaps the simplest form of measurable bias – the distribution of coverage quantity, i.e. how many times an entity of interest is referenced by a media outlet. We argue that, regardless of a positive or negative stance towards an entity, an imbalanced *quantity* of coverage, if present, is itself a form of bias<sup>5</sup>.

An outlet’s references can be biased in a number of ways:

**Party** References are focused on a particular political party.

**Front-runner** References are concentrated on a few legislators who we term “front-runners”, while the majority of legislators receive little or no attention.

<sup>4</sup>We also have a small number of blogs hosted by mass media news outlets, e.g. CNN (blog). This paper does not include analysis of such blogs.

<sup>5</sup>Our view on the meaningfulness of a measurement based solely on quantity is similar to the study of Groseclose and Milyo (2005).




Figure 2: The networked data model. There are three types of nodes: news outlets, blog outlets and legislators. An edge pointing toward a legislator represents each time an outlet references that legislator in an article or post.

**Region** References focus on certain geographical locations.

**Ideology** An ideology is a collection of ideas spanning the political spectrum. Ideological bias indicates that frequently referenced legislators favor certain ideological tendencies.

**Gender** The preference towards covering legislators of one gender.

We discuss how to measure different types of bias in a unified model. Other types of bias, such as those in favor of a particular race or ethnic group, can also be measured through our method.

Based on the measurements associated with individual media outlets, we derive system-wide bias measures that allow us to characterize and compare the bias structure between the news and blog media.

## Quantifying Bias

In this section, we describe our method for quantifying and comparing bias in News and Blogs.

**Notation** Let  $n_{ik}^c$  be number of times media outlet  $i$  references legislators in group  $k$ , where  $c \in \{\text{News, Blogs}\}$  is the media category ( $c$  is omitted when there is no need to distinguish the categories). In the case of measuring party bias,  $k \in \{D, R\}$  indicates the Democratic or Republican political parties. Let  $n_i = \sum_k n_{ik}^c$  be the total number of references made by outlet  $i$ . We begin with a specific case – measuring the two-party bias, and then describe a more general model for measuring other types of bias.

### Party Slant

A naive approach for measuring an outlet’s biased coverage of two political parties is to compare the number of times members in each party are referenced. The ratio of the reference counts of one party against the other may be used to compare outlets that reference different parties with different frequencies. There are two issues with this approach: (i) this ratio may lack statistical significance for some outlets, and (ii) it assumes that fair coverage of the two parties requires roughly equal quantities of references to each.




Figure 3: The scatter plot of number of references (observations) against party (left) and front-runner (right) slant scores for News and Blogs. Outlets with less than 20 articles are not shown.

To resolve these issues, we use the *log-odds-ratio* as follows. We define  $\theta_{ik}$ , the “slant score” of outlet  $i$  to party  $k$ , as

$$\theta_{ik} = \log(\text{odds-ratio}) = \log\left(\frac{n_{ik}/(n_i - n_{ik})}{p_k/(1 - p_k)}\right), \quad (1)$$

where  $p_k$  is the *baseline probability* that  $i$  refers to  $k$ , and here we assume this variable is fixed for all  $i$ . The advantage of having such a baseline probability is that “fairness” become configurable. For example, one can consider fairness as a 50-50 chance to reference either party (i.e.  $p_D = p_R = 0.5$ ). One can also define  $p_D = 0.6$  since roughly 60% of the studied legislators are Democrats. No matter what baseline probability is given, we have a simple interpretation:  $\theta = 0$  means no bias w.r.t that baseline. In this two-party case, we take  $\theta_i \equiv \theta_{ik}$ , with  $k = D$ , and  $\theta_i > 0$  means outlet  $i$  is more likely to be D-slanted. A slant score with value  $\alpha$  can be interpreted as follows: the number of times outlet  $i$  references Democratic legislators is  $e^\alpha$  times more than if those references followed the baseline.

The slant score’s variance is given by the Mantel-Haenszel estimator (1959):

$$\text{Var}(\theta_i) = \frac{1}{n_{ik}} + \frac{1}{n_i - n_{ik}} + \frac{1}{n_i p_k} + \frac{1}{n_i(1 - p_k)}. \quad (2)$$

The variance gives the significance of the slant score measure, which relies on the number of observations ( $n_i$  and  $n_{ik}$ ) we have for each outlet.

Figure 3 (a) shows the number of references as a function of party slant scores for outlets with more than 20 articles in our dataset. The distribution of outlets’ slant scores appears to be roughly symmetric in both directions, and outlets making more references tend to be less slanted. Table 1 lists the slant scores for some major news outlets and the most slanted blogs.

**Summary statistics** In order to characterize the overall bias within a media, we derive a system-wide bias measure based on the individual outlets’ measures. We use a *random effect* model, which assumes not only variation within each outlet, but also variation across different outlets in the system. More specifically, the model assumes that the slant scores for  $n$  outlets ( $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ ) are sampled from  $\mathcal{N}(\theta, \tau^2)$ ,

Table 1: Slant scores  $\theta$  for major news outlets and most slanted blogs. For party slant, a positive (negative) score means the outlet is likely to be D-slanted (R-slanted). For front-runner and regional slant, a larger score indicates the outlet is more focused on few particular legislators or states.

	Party ( $\theta$ )	Front-runner ( $\theta$ )	Region ( $\theta$ )
News	nbc (0.51)	washington post (1.03)	los angeles times (1.30)
	new york times (0.07)	cnn (1.02)	nbc (1.19)
	washington post (-0.01)	fox (0.91)	cbs (1.12)
	abc (-0.03)	wall street journal (0.86)	cnn (1.04)
	cbs (-0.03)	cbs (0.84)	washington times (1.00)
	los angeles times (-0.07)	nbc (0.83)	u.s. news (0.98)
	newshour (-0.10)	los angeles times (0.82)	wall street journal (0.96)
	cnn (-0.11)	msnbc (0.74)	usa today (0.96)
	fox (-0.13)	u.s. news (0.71)	washington post (0.95)
	npr (-0.14)	new york times (0.70)	msnbc (0.92)
	wall street journal (-0.15)	washington times (0.70)	npr (0.92)
	u.s. news (-0.22)	usa today (0.66)	new york times (0.89)
	bbc (-0.38)	npr (0.64)	abc (0.87)
	usa today (-0.39)	abc (0.61)	fox (0.84)
	msnbc (-0.39)	newshour (0.32)	newshour (0.78)
	washington times (-0.96)	bbc (0.00)	bbc (0.20)
Blogs	dissenting times (5.22)	arlnow.com (9.41)	blue jersey (8.32)
	cool wicked stuff (3.89)	janesville (9.05)	[...] virginia politics (7.86)
	justicedenied13501 (3.58)	take back idaho’s [...] (8.84)	politics on the hudson (7.34)
	polifrog.com (3.54)	moral science club (8.84)	calwatchdog (7.23)
	dennis miller (3.46)	murray for congress (8.67)	staradvertiser [...] (7.19)

and there are two sources of variation: the variance between outlets  $\tau^2$  and the variance within outlets  $\sigma^2$ . Hence, the model is given by

$$\hat{\theta}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta, \sigma^2 + \tau^2). \quad (3)$$

We use the DerSimonian-Laird estimator (1986) to obtain  $\theta^*$  and  $\text{Var}(\theta^*)$ , where  $\theta^*$  is the asymptotically unbiased estimator for  $\theta$ . The media-wide *collective party slant score*,  $\Theta$ , is defined as  $\Theta \equiv \theta^*$  with a  $\pm 1.96\sqrt{\text{Var}(\theta^*)}$  confidence interval.

Table 2 summarizes slants with respect to different baselines. The measure  $\Theta_{\text{con}}$  is based on the party composition of members in Congress, and  $\Theta_{\text{pop}}$  is based on the fraction of the US population represented by the legislators (in each party). The statistical significance of each measure is represented by the variance. Note that in this two-party case, a different baseline can be obtained simply by shifting the score. For example, if one chooses to use  $p_D = p_R = 0.5$  as the baseline probability, the measure  $\Theta_{0.5}$  can be calculated from  $\Theta_{\text{con}}$  by adding  $\log\left(\frac{p_D}{1-p_D}\right) \approx 0.405$  (where in terms of Congress composition  $p_D \approx 0.6$ ).

We also separate our measures for referencing members of the House and Senate to see if outlets exhibit different slants when covering the two chambers. Evaluated on the party percentage baseline, both media show R-slant when referencing Senators, and blogs are more R-slanted when referencing members of the House. Hence Blogs are overall more R-slanted than News. This interpretation depends on what baseline is chosen, however. For example, if we choose to use the 50-50 convention, both media become D-slanted. However, it is important to note that the absolute difference between the bias measures for the two media do not change with baseline.

Table 2: The collective slant scores. Parenthetical values indicate standard deviation of the measured slant score.

		House		Senate	
		$\Theta_{\text{con}}$	$\Theta_{\text{pop}}$	$\Theta_{\text{con}}$	$\Theta_{\text{pop}}$
Party	News	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.02)	-0.22 (0.03)	-0.45 (0.04)
	Blogs	-0.11 (0.02)	-0.15 (0.02)	-0.18 (0.04)	-0.41 (0.04)
Ideology	News	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.02)	-0.19 (0.04)	-0.45 (0.04)
	Blogs	-0.16 (0.02)	-0.19 (0.02)	-0.12 (0.04)	-0.39 (0.04)
Gender	News	-0.26 (0.04)	0.07 (0.03)	-0.28 (0.06)	0.45 (0.05)
	Blogs	-0.29 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.32 (0.07)	0.41 (0.06)
Front-runner	News	0.68 (0.01)	0.60 (0.01)	0.66 (0.02)	0.55 (0.03)
	Blogs	0.33 (0.01)	0.23 (0.01)	0.39 (0.02)	0.29 (0.03)
Region	News	0.97 (0.01)	-0.13 (0.01)	0.76 (0.01)	0.45 (0.03)
	Blogs	0.61 (0.01)	-0.21 (0.02)	0.44 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)

## Slant Dynamics

To study how media bias may change over time, we calculate the slant scores using references made during running windows. We measure  $\Theta(t, w)$  as a function of time  $t$  and window length  $w$ . Figure 4 shows the temporal slant scores for the two media during the four-month period, based on a  $w = 2$ -week running window. The slant of both media changes slightly after the mid-term election: Compared with their pre-election slants, News become slightly more R-slanted when referencing Senators and Blogs are more R-slanted when referencing Representatives. Overall, the media, especially Blogs, become more R-slanted after election. This is reasonable due to the Republican victories.

These results raise an important question: do the majority of outlets become more R-slanted after the election, or do R-slanted outlets become more active while D-slanted outlets become quieter? To examine what caused the slant change we plot in Fig. 5 the change in slant score  $\Delta\theta_i = \theta_i(t_2) - \theta_i(t_1)$ , where  $t_1 \in [\text{Sep. 1, Oct. 30}]$  and  $t_2 \in [\text{Nov. 7, Jan. 4}]$ , for each outlet against its slant score before the election. (Point size indicates the amount of references observed after the election.) We use a linear regression to quantify the slant change. Surprisingly, we see media outlets shifted slightly toward the other side after the election regardless of their original slants, but overall the originally D-slanted outlets become more R-slanted.

## Front-Runner Slant

To evaluate whether or not the media pay excessive attention on popular front-runners, we extend the dichotomous-outcome measure used in the previous section. We consider a generalization of the odds ratio proposed by Agresti (1980).

Let  $n_{ik}^c$  now be the number of times outlet  $i$  refers to the  $k$ -th legislator, where  $c \in \{\text{News, Blogs}\}$  as before, and  $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, L\}$  is the rank index for one of the  $L$  legislators, ordered by the number of references received from outlet  $i$ . We can replace  $n_{ik}$  by the sample proportion  $p_{ik} = n_{ik}/n_i$ . The slant score  $\theta_i$  of outlet  $i$  is defined by a generalized log-odds-ratio:

$$\theta_i = \log \left( \frac{\sum_{j>k} p_{ik} p_j}{\sum_{j<k} p_{ik} p_j} \right), \quad (4)$$




Figure 4: Slant score as a function of time. Overall, the media, especially Blogs, become more R-slanted after the 2010 election.




Figure 5: Media outlets are slightly shifting towards the other side after election. The majority of news outlets become slightly more R-slanted. For blogs, originally D-slanted blogs become more R-slanted. Each point represents a media outlet.

where  $p_j$  is, again, the baseline probability that  $i$  refers to the  $j$ -th legislator, and the  $\{p_j\}$  can be chosen to be uniform or any other distribution. For convenience we commonly fix the baseline distribution for all  $i$ .

When  $L = 2$ , Eq. 4 reduces to a dichotomous-outcome log-odds-ratio measure similar to Eq. 1. When  $L > 2$  and the  $\{p_j\}$  are not uniform, changing to a different baseline is not a simple linear shift. With Eq. 4, a slant score with value  $\alpha$  can be interpreted as follows: the number of times outlet  $i$  mentions high ranked legislators is  $e^\alpha$  times more than if the legislators were ranked according to their baseline probabilities.

The variance in the slant score is now given by (Agresti 1980):

$$\text{Var}(\theta_i) = \frac{\sum_j p_{ij} (\alpha_{ij})^2 + \sum_j p_j (\beta_{ij})^2}{n_i \left( \sum_{k>j} p_{ik} p_j \right)^2} \quad (5)$$

where

$$\alpha_{ij} = \theta_i \sum_{k < j} p_k - \sum_{k > j} p_k, \quad \beta_{ij} = \theta_i \sum_{k > j} p_{ik} - \sum_{k < j} p_{ik}.$$

Figure 3 (b) plots the number of references (observations) against front-runner slant scores for media and blog outlets with more than 20 posts in our dataset. We expect the front-runner slant scores to be mostly positive since the legislators are already ranked by popularity ( $n_{ik}$ ).

The system-wide frontrunner slant score for both news and blog media can be calculated as before. Table 2 summarizes front-runner slants with respect to various baselines. Note that the two media show different biases when referencing the two chambers: Blogs are more front-slanted than news about Senators, while news outlets are more front-slanted when referencing Representatives.

### Other Types of Slant

**Ideology** The concept of ideology is closely related to that of political party – members of the same party usually share similar or less contradictory ideologies. We study the ideological bias using a method similar to the party slant analysis. We first locate each legislator relative to an identifiable ideological orientation such as left or right, and then use the dichotomous-outcome measure to obtain ideological slant scores for individual outlets as well as system-wide scores for News and Blogs.

We use the DW-NOMINATE scores for the U.S. Congress (Lewis and Poole 2004) as measures of legislators’ ideological locations<sup>6</sup>. The estimates are based on the history of roll call votes by the members of Congress and have been widely used in political science studies and related fields. We classify each legislator as either ideologically-left or -right, based on the sign of their estimates<sup>7</sup>. We then calculate the ideological slant score  $\theta_{ik}$ ,  $k \in \{\text{Left}, \text{Right}\}$  for each outlet  $i$  with  $k = \text{Left}$  so that  $\theta_i > 0$  indicates outlet  $i$  is more likely to be Left-slanted.

Our ideological slant measurements are also summarized in Table 2. We find this measure is highly correlated with the party slant measurement (with Pearson correlation  $r = 0.958$  and  $p < 10^{-5}$ ). This suggests that, while party members may be found at different positions in the left-right spectrum, media outlets tend to pick legislators who are representatives of the two parties’ main ideologies, such as Left-wing Democrats or Right-wing Republicans.

**Gender** Gender is also treated as a dichotomous variable, where  $\theta_i > 0$  indicates that the coverage of outlet  $i$  favors male legislators. The results, summarized in Table 2, show that blogs have a slightly stronger female-slant than news. However, when considering the population baseline, the slant for both media is significant for the Senate but

<sup>6</sup>Based on their method, each member’s ideological point is estimated along two dimensions. Previous research has shown that – the first dimension reveals standard left-right or economic cleavages, and the second dimension reflects social and sectional divisions. In this paper we use only the first dimension.

<sup>7</sup>Estimates for the 111th Congress are available at: <http://voteview.spia.uga.edu/dwnomin.htm>

nearly insignificant for the House. The gender composition in both chambers is similar – 20% of the members are women. The differences in the estimates based on different baselines reflect a very different voter population represented by the female/male legislators in both chambers.

**Region** We consider region as a categorical variable. For each legislator, the state or territory of his or her district is used. The region slant is calculated like the front-runner slant: the slant score  $\theta_i$  is defined as per Eqs. 4 and 5, where  $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, S\}$  is the rank index for one of the  $S$  states in the US, ordered by the number of references received from outlet  $i$ . The results are again summarized in Table 2. Overall, news outlets show a much stronger regional bias than blogs. The negative slant scores in the House, based on the population baseline, indicate outlets’ favor those representatives from more populous states.

### Examining Coverage

As mentioned earlier, the slant scores of media outlets are calculated based only on the quantity of references to legislators, and are independent of the coverage content. In this section, we examine two intrinsic aspects of this coverage, the hyperlinks between outlets and the sentiments of the textual content, as related to the party slants.

### Links

We extract the hyperlinks embedded in each news article or blog post and study how media outlets with different slants link to one another. Using the sign of the party slant score  $\theta_p$ , we divide News and Blogs into four sectors: D-slanted news, R-slanted news, D-slanted blogs, and R-slanted blogs.

Table 3 shows the prevalence of links among the four sectors. Each entry  $(i, j)$  represents the total number of hyperlinks from outlets in category  $i$  pointing to the articles of outlets in category  $j$ . The linking pattern exhibits interesting phenomena: first and the most obvious characteristic between the two media is that news outlets have far fewer hyperlinks in their articles compared with blog posts. Blogs with more hyperlinks can also be seen as second-hand reporters or commentators in response to some news articles and other blog posts. Second, articles in the D-slanted outlets, including news and blogs, are more likely to be cited, including by outlets with the opposite slant. For example, the R-slanted blogs have a large number of hyperlinks to the D-slanted news outlets. Third, the matrix shows a strong assortativity (Newman 2003) in the D-slanted community – the D-slanted blogs are more likely to cite articles from D-slanted news and blogs than the R-slanted blogs are to cite R-slanted news and blogs. In fact, linking patterns among the R-slanted community appear to be disassortative. It would be interesting to compare our results with those of Adamic, *et al.* (2005).

### Texts

Our slant estimation is based on how many times an outlet references a legislator, regardless of positive or negative attitude. Without any sentiment information, the estimated scores need to be interpreted carefully: a significant slant

Table 3: The strength of hyperlinks among News and Blogs with Democrat or Republican slants. Each entry  $(i, j)$  represents the total number of hyperlinks from category  $i$  to  $j$ .

	News (R)	News (D)	Blogs (R)	Blogs (D)
News (R)	99	125	68	67
News (D)	84	234	69	152
Blogs (R)	256	500	287	293
Blogs (D)	298	895	299	623




Figure 6: Joint probability density for negative sentiment and party slant score. Solid line is the averaged trend. We see that D-slanted media are positively correlated with  $\theta$  while R-slanted media are negatively correlated ( $r$ : correlation coefficient;  $p$ :  $p$ -value).

score only reflects the existence of bias, but not the polarity (if any) of such bias. This subsection describes our attempt to study sentiment information within the media. We employ the OpenAmplify APIs<sup>8</sup> to extract the sentiment information of each reference. The APIs return, for each article, the detected name entities and the sentiment values associated with the entities. We derive sentiment information for (outlet, legislator) pairs by matching legislator names to the names detected in each article, then aggregate the sentiment scores associated with these legislators over all of the outlet’s articles. The sentiment scores for parties can be derived from the scores received by party members.

Figure 6 shows the probability density of the resultant negative sentiment scores against the party slant scores. The results show a weak correlation between sentiment values and the party slant scores. Outlets’ sentiments for Democratic legislators are positively correlated to their slant scores, while sentiments for Republican legislators are negatively correlated. This suggests the outlets with slants to a particular party tend to mention that party less negatively. Then tendency is easier to discover in Blogs than in News, but this can be caused by differences in the use of language rather than the level of bias.

### Modeling the reference-generating process

What are the underlying mechanisms governing how News and Blogs choose to reference legislators? Are there similarities or differences between these two media? We propose

<sup>8</sup><http://community.openamplify.com/>

to use a simple generative model (Bagrow, Sun, and ben-Avraham 2008) for the probability  $P(n)$  that a legislator is referenced a total of  $n$  times. Comparing the results of the model’s isolated mechanism with the actual data will give intuition about factors contributing to the observed  $P(n)$ .

The model is as follows. Initially ( $t = 0$ ), we assume<sup>9</sup> a single reference to some legislator  $k'$  such that  $n_k(0) = \delta(k, k')$ , for all  $k$ . At each time step the media (News or Blogs) selects a random legislator to reference in an article. With probability  $q$ , however, the media rejects that legislator and instead references a legislator with probability proportional to his or her current coverage. That is, at each time step  $t$ ,  $n_k(t + 1) = n_k(t) + 1$  occurs with probability  $p_k(t)$ :

$$p_k(t) = \begin{cases} 1/|V_L| & \text{with prob. } 1 - q, \\ n_k(t)/\sum_{k'} n_{k'}(t) & \text{with prob. } q. \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

This captures the intuitive “rich-get-richer” notion of fame, while the parameter  $q$  tunes its relative strength. Those legislators lucky (or newsworthy) enough to be referenced early on are likely to become heavily referenced, since they have more opportunities to receive references, especially as  $q$  increases. Since one reference is handed out at each timestep, the total number of references measured empirically fixes the timespan over which the model is run;  $|V_L|$  is also fixed, so the model has one parameter,  $q$ . Asymptotically ( $|V_L| \rightarrow \infty$ ), this model gives a pure power law  $P(n) \sim n^{-1-1/q}$  for all  $q > 0$  (Bagrow, Sun, and ben-Avraham 2008). The distribution of  $n$  is more complex for finite  $|V_L|$ , however, obtaining a gaussian-like form for  $q < 1/2$  and a heavy-tailed distribution for  $q > 1/2$ .

Figure 7 compares the observed  $P(n)$  with that generated using the model process. We observe good qualitative agreement, better than fitted poisson or log-normal distributions, although there is a slight tendency to overestimate popular legislators and underestimate unpopular legislators. The empirical distributions also exhibit a slight bimodality, perhaps due to the 2010 election, that is not captured by the model. The larger value of  $q$  for Blogs than for News provides evidence that Blogs collectively are more driven by a rich-get-richer selection process than News, although this may not hold at the individual outlet level.

The measures of front-runner slant indicate that News have a stronger front-runner bias than Blogs. This seems to conflict with the reference generating model, which showed that blog behavior is more explainable by the rich-get-richer mechanism ( $q$  is larger for Blogs than for News). However, we argue that the measures and the model are in fact consistent, since the model only treats the aggregate of the entire media class – the stronger front-runner bias in News outlets means that each outlet is more likely to reference their own *intrinsic* set of front-runners, which may be different from others’; for Blogs, the “stickiness” of their individual set of front-runners is weaker and hence over time globally popular front-runners are more likely to emerge. Further examination of this argument would be to explicitly model the bias of individual outlets.

<sup>9</sup>This initial condition differs from the flat start of Bagrow, et al (2008), with important consequences for finite-time models.




Figure 7: The generative model for the distribution of references  $n$  per legislator. The larger value of  $q$  for Blogs indicates that they are more driven by the rich-get-richer mechanism than News, although both distributions are heavy-tailed. Dashed lines indicated fitted poisson and log-normal distributions, for comparison.

This one-parameter model neglects a number of dynamical features that may be worth future pursuit. For example, generalizations may be able to explain temporal dynamics of the references, the joint distributions  $n_{ik}$  between media outlet  $i$  and legislator  $k$ , etc.

## Discussion and Open Issues

Our results show that News and Blogs, in aggregate, have only slightly different slants in terms of party and ideology. However, the dynamics of the party slant measures suggest blogs are more sensitive to exogenous shocks, such as the mid-term election. Our observations were made over a short, four-month timeframe, yet long-term, continuous tracking of slant dynamics would be necessary to reveal any consistently different dynamical behavior between the two media.

Our measures and model are solely based on the quantity of coverage. We have conducted preliminary sentiment analysis using an off-the-shelf tool and compared the extracted sentiment results with our measures. The results suggest a weak connection between the quantity and semantics of referencing a subject. It would be worth investigating the accuracy of sentiment detection on different media content and how sentiment analysis can be used to identify bias from texts. In addition, critical content analysis (which examines not only the text but also the relationship with audience) and multivariate analysis (since multiple types of slants are inter-related) may be leveraged for further analysis.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we develop system-wide bias measures to quantify bias in mainstream and social media, based on the number of times media outlets reference to the members of the 111th US Congress. In addition to empirical measurements, we also present a generative model to explore how each media's global distribution of the number of references per legislator evolves over time. We observe that social media are indeed more social, i.e. more affected by network and exogenous factors, resulting in a more heavily-skewed and uneven distribution of popularity. Perhaps, there are more voices than ever, but many are echoes.

We plan to continue work along the lines discussed in the previous section, such as long-term tracking of slant dynamics in the two media, modeling individual outlets' biases, and leveraging content analysis and multivariate analysis.

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